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Abstract. In the light of growing water scarcity appropriate institutional arrangements 
are needed to complement technical interventions, in order to ensure more efficient 
use and allocation of water in agriculture. A theoretically interesting institutional 
intervention is the installation or improvement of water rights, but the benefits of 
such intervention and their distribution are insufficiently researched. This paper con-
tributes to the water rights literature by applying a state-of-the-art valuation method 
to a case study in South Africa. Using a latent class choice modelling approach the 
heterogeneity in the benefits generated by changes in water rights is investigated. Two 
segments could be distinguished in the sample population. While one of the segments 
has a lot to gain from a water rights reform, benefits for the other seem rather limited. 
Furthermore they clearly differ in preference for specific improvements. Such consid-
erations should be taken into account in policy design. 
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irrigators; South-Africa
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1. Introduction
Increasing population growth, economic activity and development pose increas-
ing stress on water resources worldwide. In this context, understanding is growing that 
technical solutions alone are not sufficient to deal with this problem and that appropriate 
institutional arrangements are needed to complement the technical interventions and to 
ensure more efficient water use and allocation (Kemper, 2001; Brennan, 2002; Bruns et al., 
2005). Water (use) rights, water pricing, laws regulating water use and enforcement mech-
anisms are examples of such institutional arrangements (Kemper, 2001). 
The theoretical rationale for establishing water rights is based on arguments of effi-
ciency. Araral (2010) for example states that only when water rights are clearly defined, 
Pareto optimal outcomes are possible and Molle (2004) explains that clearly defined water 
rights will reduce uncertainty and conflicts. 
1 Corresponding author: Stijn.speelman@ugent.be.
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In this study a choice experiment (CE) considering hypothetical water rights configu-
rations was conducted for studying the gains associated to water right improvements in 
South Africa. This approach is similar to the one taken in Frija et al.(2008), Speelman et 
al.(2010a,b) and Veettil et al. (2011). The current study uses the same dataset as Speel-
man et al. (2010a,b). Nevertheless, Speelman et al. (2010b) mainly focused on the aver-
age benefits of such reforms. Some interaction terms were introduced in the rank ordered 
logit model to get a first insight into the effect of socio-economic variables, but the num-
ber of interactions that can be included is limited2. In Speelman et al. (2010a) a differ-
ent approach was therefore taken: the population was divided in a number of segments 
according to a number of socioeconomic variables. Such segmentations allow to see the 
effect on all the attributes, however it is not shown whether the effects in the different 
segmentations reinforce or counter each other. As a consequence the potential to devel-
op targeted policies is limited when using this approach. Therefore in the current article 
the data from the choice experiment are analysed using a latent class modelling approach. 
This adds a focus on the heterogeneity in benefits between groups of respondents to the 
previous literature. Understanding is not only gained on the aggregate or average econom-
ic value associated with changes in the water rights framework, but also on the distribu-
tion of the benefits among clearly identified groups of respondents (Boxall and Adamow-
icz, 2002). Studying the potential of water right improvements for smallholders in South 
Africa is relevant in the light of their poor production performance and of the weak cost 
recovery at smallholder irrigation schemes under a general context of water scarcity. 
Moreover these smallholders consist of a heterogeneous group (van Averbeke et al., 2011; 
Denison and Manona, 2007), justifying the focus on the heterogeneity in benefits.
The aim of the study is therefore to reveal the economic value for smallholders of the 
benefits generated by improving the water rights framework and to show how these ben-
efits are differing across beneficiaries. Given the context described above, such informa-
tion is highly relevant for policy-makers. The second section reviews the literature on the 
importance of water rights. In the third section the relevance of choosing the smallholder 
irrigation sector in South Africa for this case study is explained by assessing the current 
water rights framework and the smallholder sector. The fourth section describes the dif-
ferent steps in the methodology, with an additional focus on the importance of account-
ing for heterogeneity. Then the results are presented and discussed. Finally conclusions are 
formulated, highlighting the policy relevance. 
2. Literature review
From a New Institutional Economics Perspective, water rights are seen as an institu-
tion that serves as a source of incentives for individual and group behaviour governing 
water use. They serve as a mechanism for avoiding externalities in the use of water and 
they generate incentives for efficient resource use and for avoiding depletion and overex-
ploitation (Narain, 2009). The way water rights are defined will structure the incentives 
and disincentives which members of society face in their decisions regarding water own-
2 As a consequence this approach only allows to see the effect of some socio-economic variables on some specific 
water right attributes, not on the entire set. 
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ership, use and transfer. Moreover, a well-defined set of rules is necessary to allow market 
transactions to take place (Qureshi et al., 2009). As indicated by Challen (2000, 2002) and 
Wichelns (2004), the potential inefficiency of water rights is linked to the transaction costs 
associated with the making of decisions over the use of water. In general ill-defined prop-
erty rights create higher transaction costs (information search, negotiation, monitoring) 
and limit the value people assign to a resource (Randall, 1978; Ostrom, 2000; Heltberg, 
2002; Linde-Rahr, 2008). This confines the incentives for resource users to sustainably 
manage a resource (Matthews, 2004; Hodgon, 2006; Yandle, 2007).
The focus of empirical work on property rights has thus far mainly been on explain-
ing the role and functioning of property rights over natural resources, and in part 
on their emergence. There is however a need for research that quantifies the benefits 
of improving rights (Brennan, 2002; Dinar and Saleth, 2005; Linde-Rahr, 2008; Irimie 
and Essmann, 2009; Araral, 2010) and that identifies how these benefits differ within 
the population. Transaction costs theory offers an interesting framework to study policy 
changes (Challen, 2002; Crase et al., 2002). In contexts where respondents face policy 
related transaction costs, such as those originating from ill-defined water rights, choice 
modelling and standard contingent valuation surveys can be used to estimate willing-
ness to pay to reduce transaction costs, in this way evaluating the institutional settings 
(Mc Cann et al.,2005). Some applications of this approach to evaluate potential chang-
es in a prevailing institutional structure were recently developed for the case of water 
rights (e.g., Crase et al., 2002; Herrera et al., 2004; Frija et al., 2008; Speelman et al., 
2010a,b; Veettil et al., 2011). 
3. Case study background 
3.1. Water rights in South Africa
In South Africa the National Water Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) abolished 
the previous system of water rights and entitlements, which were linked to the land rights. 
A new system of administrative limited-period and conditional authorizations to use 
water, called licenses, was installed (Nieuwoudt, 2002). In the new system ownership of 
water is held by the state, implying that the authorizations only concern usufruct rights. 
To use water, a person must be issued with a licence by the Department of Water Affairs 
(DWAF). This water use licence will specify the water user, the property or area where the 
water may be used, the specific use authorized, and in most instances conditions of use 
(Republic of South Africa, 1998). 
Although the new water rights system is not yet made fully operational, several short-
comings have already been identified (Tewari, 2009). While quantities will be specified 
in the water use license, they are not guaranteed or enforced (Republic of South Africa, 
1998). In this way water supply is not perceived as reliable by farmers. Furthermore Louw 
and Van Schalkwyk (2002) and Tewari (2009) have criticized the provisions made in 
the National Water Act regarding transferability. Market forces are generally believed to 
ensure efficient allocation of water (Bjornlund and McKay, 2002; Nieuwoudt and Armit-
age, 2004; Zekri and Easter, 2007; Brooks and Harris, 2008; Tewari 2009). In South Africa 
however a water management agency has the responsibility over the trade in water use 
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authorizations. This administrative procedure3 proposed in the Water Act seems to create 
unnecessary transaction costs certainly for transfers occurring among irrigators within the 
same irrigation scheme. According to Donohew (2009) the potential negative externali-
ties of such transfers are limited. The administrative procedure might therefore limit the 
potential efficiency gains from water right transfers (Shi, 2006; Donohew, 2009; Tewari, 
2009). Finally a five year review period of the licenses is foreseen. This should allow gov-
ernment to take timely measures to maintain the integrity of the water resources, to main-
tain a balance between available water and water requirements, or to accommodate chang-
es in water use priorities (DWAF, 2004). Backeberg (2006) and Tewari (2009) explain 
that this short review period will have a negative effect on farmers’ investment decisions. 
Because the conditions (for instance the volumes of abstractions) attached to licenses may 
change at each review, this gives farmers the impression that the licenses are insecure 
(Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004). 
3.2. The South African smallholder irrigation sector
Smallholder irrigation is considered as an important rural development factor in 
South Africa. It is believed to create employment opportunities, generate income and 
enhance food security (Perret, 2002). Nevertheless performance and economic success of 
the smallholder irrigation schemes have been very poor and fall far short of the expecta-
tions of planners, politicians, development agencies and the participants themselves (van 
Averbeke et al., 2011). In a context of increasing water scarcity, the smallholder irrigation 
schemes suffer from poor cost recovery of water service costs (Perret and Geyser, 2007) 
and poor water use efficiency (Yokwe, 2009). Huge investments are made to rehabilitate 
existing schemes (Perret and Geyser, 2007). In these revitalization programmes there 
also is attention for institutional solutions (Denison and Manona, 2007). There are how-
ever inequalities and significant class-based differences among the households engaged in 
smallholder irrigation, generating different farming styles with divergent interests (Deni-
son and Manona, 2007; Cousins, 2010). It is thus important to take this heterogeneity into 
account in the formulation and evaluation of reform policies, because too much emphases 
on common interest will certainly lead to policy failures. 
4. Methodology and data
4.1. Designing the choice experiment
For the analysis of the benefits of improving the water rights system in South Africa 
a choice experiment was developed. Choice experiments are a survey-based technique for 
modelling preferences for goods, where goods are described in terms of their attributes 
and the level these take. Respondents are presented with various descriptions of the good, 
3 In the National Water Act it is stated that permanent transfers, constituting trade in water licenses, will be sub-
ject to all requirements for license applications. This means that the water management authority has to approve 
every transfer. One of the criteria that will be used in the evaluation is that a balance should be maintained 
between the interest of the parties involved in the trade and the general public interest (DWAF, 2004).
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differentiated by the attribute levels and they are asked to select their preferred alternative. 
Choice experiments enable to value multidimensional interventions in a system (Han-
ley et al., 2001, Burton et al., 2007; Rigby et al., 2010). In our study, they will be used to 
determine willingness to pay (WTP) for improvements in the water rights system. These 
WTP values reflect the potential benefits obtained by water users from changes in the 
water rights system. Because they are relying on the choice between a series of alterna-
tives, instead of asking for respondents’ WTP explicitly, choice experiments are considered 
a reliable way of eliciting WTP values (Hanley et al., 2001).
The design of a choice experiment involves the specification of the attributes and their 
levels. Based on literature review (Louw and van Schalkwyk, 2002; Perret, 2002; Nieu-
woudt and Armitage, 2004; Backeberg, 2006; Pott et al., 2009, Tewari, 2009) and expert 
knowledge4, three water rights dimensions are chosen as attributes. These characteristics 
do not consist of operational-level rights5 but rather of so called “property rights dimen-
sions”. Yandle (2007) describes how these dimensions can be used to assess the quality 
of a property right. Attenuation of the right with respect to one of these dimensions is 
expected to lead to a lower quality property right, reducing the value for the owner (Crase 
and Dollery, 2006). In our case “duration”, “transferability” and “quality of title” are con-
sidered. “Duration” refers to the period of time for which the operational-level rights are 
guaranteed or the time until the rights regime is renegotiated. If duration increases, rights 
holders will have more incentives to use a resource sustainably (Backeberg, 2006; Yandle, 
2007). “Transferability” considers if transfers of water rights are allowed and which proce-
dures are used for transfers. The “quality of the title” dimension describes the capacity of 
the title to adequately define the resource and how much of a resource rights holders may 
extract. This dimension is related to the reliability of the supply. Theoretically it is expect-
ed that rights with longer duration, where transferability is least restricted and where sup-
ply is guaranteed will be preferred. To be able to economically value attribute changes, it is 
necessary to also include a pricing vehicle in the choice experiment. Here water charge is 
included for this purpose.
The next step in the specification of the attribute space is the stipulation of the attri-
bute levels that will be used in the experiment. For duration two levels are included ‘5 
years’ and ‘10 years’. For transferability the levels considered are ‘no transfer’; ‘agency 
based transfer’ and ‘market transfer’ and for “quality of the title”, two levels are used in 
this study: ’no guaranteed supply’ and ‘guaranteed supply’. Finally three water charge levels 
are used: 0.06, 0.09 and 0.12 R/m³. A more elaborated discussion on the choice for these 
levels can be found in Speelman et al. (2010a). Table 1 gives an overview of the different 
attributes and their levels. 
After the selection of the attributes and the determination of the levels, the choice 
sets, which will be presented to the respondents, need to be constructed. In this case all 
possible combinations of four attributes, two with two different levels and two with three 
different levels would provide 36 possible water right definitions. This is called a full fac-
torial design. Clearly, it would not be feasible for respondents to choose among 36 pro-
files. Therefore, as described in Speelman et al. (2010a) a three stage procedure was used 
4 The attributes were discussed with officials from the DWAF and the Water Research Commission 
5 Operational level rights determine the actions a property rights holder must, may, or can not take with regard 
to a resource
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generating three blocks of three choice sets each containing four choice options. Finally a 
graphical representation was used for the attributes and their levels because it was expect-
ed that part of the respondent population would be illiterate. 
4.2. Importance of accounting for heterogeneity
Farms are heterogeneous with regard to a range of factors like input endowments, 
ownership structure, location, farm management and crop mix. As a result policy 
interventions will have differential effects on them. This will be reflected in differenc-
es in their preferences and consequently also in their behaviour. Agent-based models 
specifically try to capture this heterogeneity (Straton et al., 2009), but also in choice 
models acknowledging this is very important. Understanding the extent and form of 
the heterogeneity will promote usefulness of the results for policy formulation (Ruto 
et al., 2008). A proper representation of heterogeneity improves the insight in the fac-
tors underlying respondent behaviour and willingness to pay, and how the benefits 
and costs of policies are distributed across beneficiaries (Colombo et al., 2009). Fur-
thermore researchers have found that when heterogeneous preferences are not prop-
erly accounted for, valuable information is discarded and inconsistent estimates and 
biased welfare measures are obtained (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Birol et al., 2006; 
Carlsson et al., 2003; Hynes et al., 2008; Bujosa et al., 2010). Provencher and Bishop 
(2004) showed in a simulation study that the models accounting for heterogeneity out-
perform the ones that assume homogeneity of preferences (in the absence of specifica-
tion errors). Unfortunately, most environmental studies so far assumed homogeneity 
of preferences (Hanley et al., 2003), implying that all respondents are assumed to have 
the same taste for attributes. This is a very serious limitation in many environmental 
related issues where there is wide variation in preferences for attributes. For the case of 
changes in water rights attributes, Veettil et. al (2011) for example have reported wide 
variations in preferences among farmers. To our knowledge, the study by Veettil et al. 
(2011) up to now was the only one which relaxed the homogeneity assumption in the 
property right preference elicitation process by assuming perfect heterogeneity. How-
ever assuming perfect heterogeneity is not that useful for policy formulation, because 
policy makers usually are interested in policies targeted towards specific sections of the 
population. 
Table 1. Attributes and levels used in the choice sets in South Africa.
Attributes Levels
Transferability not transferable agency based transfer market transfer
Duration 5 year 10 year
Quality of the title guaranteed quantity no guaranteed quantity 
Price* 0.06 R/m³ 0.09 R/m³ 0.12 R/m³
*The average exchange rate at the time of data collection was 1R=0.13US$.
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4.3. Econometric Model 
In this study a latent class model (LCM) is used for the econometric analysis of the 
data collected. This type of model, which CE practitioners have started employing most 
recently, allows accounting for preference heterogeneity (Birol et al., 2006). The underly-
ing theory of the LCM posits that individual behaviour depends on observable attributes 
and on latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are unobserved by the analyst. 
This heterogeneity can be captured through a model of discrete parameter variation. Thus, 
it is assumed that individuals are implicitly sorted into a set of Q classes, but the class 
membership of any particular individual, whether known or not to that individual, is 
unknown to the analyst (Greene and Hensher, 2003). 
In LCM, the population thus consists of a finite and identifiable number of groups 
of individuals (i.e., segments or classes), each characterised by relatively homogenous 
preferences. These classes, however, differ substantially in their preference structure. This 
approach can accommodate preference heterogeneity while allowing for the number of 
classes to be determined endogenously by the data. In the LCM, belonging to a class with 
specific preferences is probabilistic, and depends on the social, economic and attitudinal 
characteristics of the respondents (Birol et al., 2006).
In this paper we follow Greene and Hensher (2003) and employ a standard LCM 
specification which assumes a random utility model. This model has two parts, an observ-
able component (βsXnjt) and an unobservable random component εnjt|s. Thus, the utility 
that an individual n obtains from selecting alternative j in the tth choice set is
Unjt|s = βsXnjt + εnjt|s (1)
where U is the utility obtained by individual, β is a vector of parameters of segment s, X 
is a vector of attributes from the CE and ε is a random component following a Type 1 
extreme distribution. It is assumed that the systematic component (βsXnjt) of Equation (1) 
can be decomposed into two components. The first relates to the specific attributes of the 
choice made. The second captures individual specific characteristics (i.e., socio-economic 
and attitudinal variables).
The choice probability for an individual n, given that he belongs to segment s, of 






























138 S. Speelman , P.C. Veettil
where Zn is a vector of individual-specific variables and as a vector of segment specific 
utility parameters to be estimated.
The unconditional probability that any randomly selected respondent chooses an 
alternative is obtained by combining the conditional probability in (2) with the segment 

































In the LCM the heterogeneity in preferences is thus incorporated through the system-
atic component of utility (βsXnjt). There also exist models such as the Covariance Hetero-
geneity model, which incorporate heterogeneity in the error components (Colombo et al., 
2009). A major advantage of the proposed LCM is its ability to enrich the traditional eco-
nomic choice model by including psychological factors. This integrated modeling strategy 
also offers an opportunity to merge various social psychological and economic theories 
in explaining behaviour (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). Hence the proposed LCM is well 
suited for our case study.
The parameters in Equation (4) are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure using LIMDEP 9.0 NLOGIT 4.0. Estimation requires the number of segments 
S to be determined in advance. We therefore run models with 2, 3 and 4 segments and 
employ various statistical criteria to select the “optimal” number segments. The log like-
lihood, ρ2, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC)6 are used to determine the optimal number of segments (Ruto et al., 2008; Colombo 
et al., 2009). 
Once the parameter estimates have been obtained, a measure of economic value can 
be derived for each water right attribute using the formula given in equation 5 below 
(Hanemann, 1984). These ratios, which are often referred to as marginal implicit prices 
can also be interpreted as a marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between water rights 
attributes and money: the coefficient βm gives the marginal utility of income and is the 
coefficient of the price attribute, and βk is the coefficient of the water rights attributes: 
WTP= βk/- βm (5)
This WTP for attribute changes and the 95% confidence intervals were estimated for 
the different segments of the LCM using the Wald Procedure (Delta method) in LIMDEP 
9.0 NLOGIT 4.0.
6 The model has the most optimal fit when these criteria are minimized. The Akaike criterion is specified as 
−2lnL+Jδ, where lnL is the log-likelihood of the model at convergence, J is the number of estimated parameters 
in the model, and δ is a penalty constant which equals 3 ; The Bayesian criterion is specified as −lnL+(J/2)*ln(N) 
where lnL is the log-likelihood of the model at convergence, J is the number of estimated parameters in the 
model and N is the number of observations
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4.4. Data
The choice experiment was conducted in April 2008 in the Limpopo province of 
South Africa. Seven irrigation schemes were identified from the national database of 
smallholder irrigation schemes. The sample included both larger irrigation schemes with 
over 100 farmers and smaller schemes with only 30-40 farmers. In addition differences 
in cropping patterns, reflecting varying degrees of water scarcity, were covered7. Within 
the schemes about 30% of the farmers were randomly selected from a list of active farm-
ers. In total 134 questionnaires were completed, providing 402 choice sets. Besides the CE 
experiment, there was a structured questionnaire collecting detailed information regard-
ing farming activities, alternative income sources and other relevant institutional aspects 
of water management. 
5. Results 
In Table 2 some socio-economic and farm characteristics of the respondents in the 
sample are presented. The average age of the farmers in the sample was 58 years. They have 
a low education level (average of 5.6 years of schooling) and own small plots (average of 1.2 
ha of irrigated land). This picture of an aging and low educated farming population, cul-
tivating small plots at smallholder irrigation schemes in rural South Africa was described 
by several authors (Perret, 2002; Hope et al., 2008). Also the finding that a majority of the 
famers was female (62%) is in line with these studies. On average the respondents produce 
4 crops. Maize is the main summer crop while spinach, beans, beetroots, cabbages and 
tomatoes were the most important winter crops in the sample. The monetary income gen-
erated by irrigated agriculture is quite low. For most of the households in the sample, crop-
ping is not their primary income source. As in most rural areas of South Africa, pensions 
and child allowances are more important income sources (Perret, 2002; Hope et al., 2008). 
The non-farm income of the respondents is highly variable. Also the income share from 
irrigated farming among the farmers was highly varying, ranging between 1% and 100% 
with an average of 29%. Higher dependency on income from irrigated farming was gener-
ally associated with a lower overall income level, as it generally reflected an absence of oth-
er income sources. It must be noted that most production is subsistence-oriented. Farmers 
were furthermore questioned about their trust in water management institutions. For three 
levels of water management institutions8 they could indicate their degree of trust on a 4 
point Likert scale. The three scores were then combined in an overall trust score. The aver-
age trust score of 2.4 indicates that overall trust level is in between “trust somewhat” and 
“do not trust very much”. A majority of the farmers (61.2%) did already experience water 
shortages and a small majority (53.7%) already experienced conflicts about water. Finally, 
in irrigation schemes the distance from the water intake often has an impact on the quan-
tity of water available and on the supply reliability. The situation of the plots of the respon-
dents within the irrigation scheme was therefore also recorded. It is observed that more 
7 In the drier parts of Limpopo most farmers are limited to growing maize during the wet summer season. In 
other parts of the province production is more diversified, with the majority of the farmers producing maize in 
summer and a wide variety of crops in winter.
8 See Speelman et al., 2010a for more details 
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head-end farmers are included in the sample (42.5%), compared to middle (28.4) and tail-
end farmers (29.1). Possibly this is because we sampled among active farmers and given 
the worse water supply situation the percentage of unused plots in the middle and tail-end 
parts of the schemes might be higher. 
Table 2. Selected sample population characteristics.
Mean (st. dev ) Min-max
Continuous variables 57.8 (13.2) 27-85
Farmers’ age (years)
Education (years) 5.6 (4.5) 0-15
Household size 6.4 (2.7) 1-15
# crops cultivated 4 (2.5) 1-11
Irrigated plot size (ha) 1.2 (0.4) 0.4-4
Income from irrigation (R/year) 1993 (2798) 0-16504
Income share from irrigation (%) 29 (24) 0-100 
Non-farm income (R/year) 16672 (16708) 0-94320
Trust in water management institutions 2.4 (0.9) 1-4
Categorical variables
Gender (% male) 37.3
Occurrence of water conflicts (% no) 46.3








The first step in the latent class model approach is determining the number of seg-
ments. Table 3 presents the statistical criteria used for this decision. The log likelihood 
and ρ2 statistics improve as more segments are added, supporting the presence of multiple 
segments in the sample. The 2-segment solution provides the best fit to the data since, 
although AIC statistics decreases, BIC starts to increase again as more segments are added 
to the model. Improvements in the other criteria are also much smaller from 2 to 3 and 3 
to 4 segment models.
For comparison Table 4 first provides the results of the conditional logit. These results 
were also presented in Speelman et al. (2010a,b). All the coefficients in the conditional logit 
model are highly significant and all the signs are as expected a priori. All of the water rights 
attributes are significant factors in the choice for a water right specification, and a posi-
tive change in any single attribute increases the probability that a particular specification is 
selected. In other words, the respondents prefer water rights with longer duration, guaran-
teed supply, which are transferable. The sign of the price coefficient indicates that the effect 
on utility of choosing a choice set with a higher price level is negative. When the price attri-
bute is used as the normalizing variable, the most important attribute is guaranteed supply.
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Table 3. Criteria to determine optimal number of segments.
# segments Log likelihood ρ2 AIC BIC
1 -1051.5 0.371 1.752 1.773
2 -948.8 0.432 1.600 1.667
3 -932.9 0.441 1.592 1.706
4 -925.4 0.446 1.598 1.758
Table 4. Results of the conditional logit and latent class models.
CL 
LCM
Segment 1 Segment 2
Duration 0.096*** (0.014) 0.126*** (0.033) 0.112*** (0.011)
Quality of title 0.628***(0.038) 3.19*** (1.211) 0.318*** (0.029)
Price -0.048***(0.015) -0.140*** (0.039) -0.031** (0.013)
Agency based transfer 0.230***(0.050) -0.093 (0.112) 0.355*** (0.037)
Market transfer 0.360***(0.051) 0.902 (0.106) 0.509*** (0.046)
Model statistics
Pseudo ρ² 0.371 0.432
Log L -1051.469 -948.868 
Segment function LCM : respondents’ social and economic characteristics
Constant 1.221 (1.340)
Trust in water management institutions -0.629 ** (0.298)
Farmers ‘ age -0.014 (0.016)
Gender -1.020 ** (0.455)
Income share from irrigation -0.327 (0.934)
Occurrence of water conflictsa -0.181 (0.479)
a Dummy variable indicating whether respondents have already experienced conflicts regarding irriga-
tion water.
***1% significance level,** 5% significance level, *10% significance level with two-tailed tests.
Next the results of the 2-segment LCM are reported in Table 4. The upper part of 
the table displays the utility coefficients from water rights attributes, where the lower part 
reports the segment membership coefficients. The segment membership coefficients for the 
second segment are normalized to zero allowing identification of the segment membership 
coefficients for the first segment (Birol et al., 2006). These coefficients are then interpreted 
relative to this normalized segment. For segment 1 the utility coefficients for all attributes 
except the transferability attributes are significant and the segment membership coefficients 
reveal that having trust in the water management institutions and being male decreases the 
probability that a respondent belongs to the first segment. The other factors do not signifi-
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cantly affect membership. For the second segment all attributes are significant determinants 
of the choice, and except for the price attribute, higher levels of these attributes increase the 
likelihood that respondents in segment 2 choose a particular water right specification. The 
effect of a higher price is significant and is again negative for this segment.
The relative size of each segment is estimated by inserting the estimated coefficients 
into equation (3). This generates a series of probabilities of each respondent belonging to 
either one of the two segments. Based on their largest probability score the respondents 
are assigned to one of the segments. It is found that 36.5% of the sample belongs to the 
first segment and 63.5% belongs to the second segment. 
In Table 5 the descriptive statistics for a number of social, economic and farming 
characteristics of each segment are reported. A significant higher proportion of respon-
dents in the second segment is male, they are better educated, have more trust in water 
management institutions and are spatially located closer to the schemes’ water intake. On 
average they have both higher non-farm and farm incomes, but for irrigation income the 
difference with segment 1 is not significant. Age, household size and occurrence of water 
conflicts are also not significantly differing between the two segments. 
Table 5. Profiles of respondents belonging to the two segments.
Segment 1 (n=49) Segment 2 (n=85)
Gender (% male) *** 22 45
Farmers’ age 56 (11.5) 60 (14.1)
Household size 6.7 (3.0) 6.2 (2.5)
Education** 4.4 (4.2) 6.3 (4.5)
Field situation
Head % 35  47
Middle % 35 25
Tail % 30 28
Occurence of water conflicts (% no) 46 47
Trust in water management institutions *** (average score) 2.2 (0.8) 2.6(0.9)
Non-farm income ***(R) 12551.5 (9633.5) 19048.2 (19323.4) 
Income from irrigation 1732.2(2757.5) 2140.8 (2826.3)
# crops cultivated 3.9 (2.6) 4 (2.6)
Occurence of water shortage (% no) 38 39
T-tests and Pearson Chi square tests show significant differences (*) at 10% significance level; (**) at 
5% significance level, and (***) at 1% significance level.
Finally Table 6 presents the implicit prices and their confidence intervals for attribute 
changes for respondents of both segments. For the qualitative attributes the implicit prices 
reflect the WTP for a level change, for example smallholders in the first segment are will-
ing to pay 0.2283 R/m³ for water if there would be a shift from non-guaranteed to guar-
anteed supply. For the duration which is included as a quantitative attribute the implicit 
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price is the WTP for a unit increase in this attribute. It can be observed that for most 
attributes WTP for changes is clearly lower among respondents of the first segment. Only 
for guaranteed supply a substantial WTP is found for respondents of this segment. 
Table 6. Segment specific willingness to pay for changes in water right dimensions and 95% confi-
dence intervals (figures are in 0.01R/m³).




Quality of title 22.830(3.925; 41.735)
10.246
(1.730; 18.762)
Agency based transfer -0.663(-2.208; 0.882)
11.410
(1.765; 21.055)




In comparison with the earlier studies by Speelman et al. (2010a,b) the LCM 
approach allowed us to identify that the smallholder population consists of two distinct 
groups with a different preference structure. This information can help policy makers 
to target their interventions. This finding is also in line with the observation of Denison 
and Manona, (2007) who claimed that smallholder irrigators in South Africa are hetero-
geneous, with different farming styles making it impossible to design one-fit-all policy 
interventions. A first clear difference between the two segments in our LCM is observed 
with respect to the attitude towards a shift to agency based water right transfers. This is 
revealed in table 4 and table 6. The difference could possibly be explained by differences 
in the level of trust in the water management institutions between the two segments. This 
effect of trust was also suggested in Speelman et al. (2010a), where a segmentation was 
made based on trust level. The respondents in segment 1, which have a significantly lower 
trust in the water management institutions, dislike the idea of a system of agency based 
transfers, while for the respondents in segment 2, preference is clearly positively influ-
enced by such a system, resulting in a positive WTP. While for respondents of the second 
segment the ongoing water pricing reforms9 and the water right reforms can thus go hand 
in hand, this does not seem the case for those of the first segment. For policy makers this 
emphasizes the need to acknowledge the complementarity between different institutional 
reforms as identified by Veettil et al. (2011) and earlier by Saleth and Dinar (2005). To 
make this complementarity work for irrigators of the first segment water management 
institutions should gain the trust from these water users. An obvious way to do this is by 
improving the functioning and service delivery of these institutions. Also a recognition 
9 The introduction of water charges is one of the ongoing reforms in the South-African water sector (DWAF, 
2004)
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in the institutional structure of the traditional governance systems managing the access 
to and the use of water resources in the rural communities might be a crucial issue to 
increase local trust (Kapfudzaruwa and Sowman, 2009). 
A second important finding is that respondents from the first segment are more sensi-
tive to the price attribute. When considering their socio-economic profile, this is in line 
with expectations, because several characteristics (income levels, gender, field situation, 
education level) seem to indicate that the respondents in segment 1 are socio-econom-
ically worse off than those in segment 2. Therefore the higher price coefficient and the 
lower levels for most other attributes may well reflect the limited capacity of these poorer 
farmers to pay for water, a problem already identified by Backeberg (2006) and Perret and 
Geyser (2007). Since the WTP for attribute changes is a reflection of the benefits for farm-
ers generated by these changes, it is shown that water right reforms clearly generate less 
benefits for farmers of the first segment. Policy makers will have to design other interven-
tions to lift up this poorest, more subsistence oriented segment of the smallholder popula-
tion. Denison and Manona, (2007) for example propose that interventions to reduce the 
market dependency for inputs and outputs would be an interesting intervention for this 
type of farmers because it reduces external cash exchange and supports risk reduction.
In contrast with their low WTP for other attribute changes, respondents of the first 
segment have a high WTP for guaranteed water supply. These farmers rely more on irri-
gated agriculture for their income and livelihood. As a consequence they seem to be more 
risk averse with respect to failures in water availability. In their typology of smallhold-
ers Denison and Manona (2007) distinguish a similar type of smallholders and suggest 
that interventions to reduce risk are best suited for this type of farmers. This is confirmed 
by our findings because guaranteeing water supply is such a risk reducing intervention. 
Given the heterogeneous risk profile of the two segments a potentially interesting inter-
vention would be the introduction of security differentiated water rights. Lefebvre et al. 
(2012) showed that such a system offers interesting opportunities in terms of risk alloca-
tion. From a government perspective this would probably also be a less costly measure 
compared to guaranteeing water supply for all. 
Finally a plausible explanation for the larger preference for water rights with longer 
durations among respondents in segment 2 could be the positive relationship between 
education and investments in productivity. This relationship implies that better educated 
people are more inclined to make investments to increase productivity, but as explained 
by Backeberg (2006) typically this type of investment decisions is negatively affected by a 
short duration of the licenses.
7. Conclusions
Better institutional arrangements to coordinate use and resolve conflicts are highly 
needed for the water sector in many countries (Brennan, 2002). In this light, there is a 
growing understanding that irrigation water rights are important and that a lack of effec-
tive water rights systems creates problems for the management of water supplies (Mat-
thews, 2004; Bruns et al., 2005). 
This paper contributes to the water rights literature by applying a latent class valuation 
of water rights reforms to a case study of smallholder irrigators in South Africa. We assess 
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the economic value for smallholders of the benefits generated by improving their water 
rights. As Ruto et al. (2008) indicate it is also important to understand what underlies dif-
ferences in values that people place on institutional changes. In our study we aim to under-
stand who benefits from which reforms. Our latent class modelling approach allows us to 
capture and explain the heterogeneity in the preference structure of smallholder irrigators. 
In general our results are in line with theoretical expectations (Bruns et al., 2005; Hodgson, 
2006) regarding the benefits of water rights reforms: for smallholders there are positive and 
significant economic benefits associated with the improvements of the water rights. Never-
theless two segments could be distinguished. While one of the segments has a lot to gain 
from a water rights reform, benefits for the other seem rather limited. To stimulate this lat-
ter segment other policy interventions might be more suitable. This confirms the findings 
of Denison and Manona (2007), who in their report on the revitalization of the smallholder 
irrigation sector in South Africa identified several types of farmers and suggested that dif-
ferent policy initiatives would be needed for each of them. Furthermore the segments clear-
ly differed in their preference for individual changes in water right dimensions. The dif-
ference in WTP for guaranteed supply for example reveals an heterogeneity in risk profile 
of the segments and could be a reason to consider security differentiated water rights. The 
demonstrated heterogeneity in benefits therefore shows the importance of targeted policies 
Moreover by using the knowledge concerning heterogeneity in the formulation of policies, 
acceptance of/ and support by stakeholders can be increased.
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